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Abstract. The use of biometrics, and fingerprint recognition in par-
ticular, for cardholder authentication in smartcard systems is growing
in popularity, and such systems are the focus of this paper. In such a
biometrics-based cardholder authentication system, sensitive data will
typically need to be transferred between the smartcard and the card
reader. We propose strategies to ensure integrity of the sensitive data
exchanged between the smartcard and the card reader during authen-
tication of the cardholder to the card, and also to provide mutual au-
thentication between card and reader. We examine two possible types of
attacks: replay attacks and active attacks in which an attacker is able to
calculate hashes and modify messages accordingly.
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1 Introduction
Traditional methods for automated personal identification mainly employ the
possession of a token (magnetic card, USB-token) and/or the knowledge of a se-
cret (password, PIN) to establish the identity of an individual. However a token
can be lost, stolen, misplaced, or willingly given to an unauthorised person, and a
secret can be forgotten, guessed, or unwillingly — or willingly — disclosed to an
unauthorised person. Biometrics has emerged as a powerful tool for automated
identification systems. Since it is based on physiological and behavioural char-
acteristics of the individual, biometrics does not suffer from the disadvantages
of the traditional methods.
In parallel, smartcards have steadily grown in popularity, as have their stor-
age capacity and processing capabilities. The computing power of modern smart-
cards allows a wide variety of applications, from support for PKI to decentralised
applications requiring off-line transactions [4, 14, 15]. Smartcards also offer the
possibility of executing multiple applications on a single card. To implement
controlled access to the functionalities of the card, smartcard systems typically
require a method for cardholder authentication. Not only does cardholder au-
thentication address the issue of card theft or misappropriation but it also allows
the system to grant different access rights to different users of the same card.
2An example of the latter can be drawn from health care applications where the
patient and the physician access the same card belonging to the patient.
Biometrics and smartcards have the potential to be a very useful combination
of technologies. On the one hand the security and convenience of biometrics
allow for the implementation of high-security applications on smartcards. On the
other hand smartcards represent a secure and portable way of storing biometric
templates, which would otherwise need to be stored in a central database. Among
the various biometrics technologies in use today, fingerprint recognition seems
to be particularly suitable for smartcard systems.
A smartcard system is composed of two main physical units: the smartcard
itself and the card reader. Depending on how the logical modules of the biometric
system are distributed between the card and the card reader, biometrics-based
cardholder authentication may require the transmission of sensitive data, such
as a biometric live sample or a biometric template, between the two units. It is
therefore fundamental to ensure the integrity of transmitted data during card-
holder authentication. It is also important to provide mutual authentication
between the two units, so as to prevent use of fraudulent cards or card readers.
In [3], weaknesses of the biometric system model are identified and some
countermeasures are suggested, although no particular security protocol is pro-
posed. Moreover, no assumptions as to the actual architecture of the system is
made and the analysis is rather general in nature. In this paper, we analyse a spe-
cific system architecture that reflects the current state of the art for smartcard
systems. Our focus is on security issues associated with the communications link
between the smartcard and the card reader during fingerprint-based cardholder
authentication. We propose strategies to ensure integrity of the data exchanged
between the smartcard and the card reader, and also to provide mutual authen-
tication between the two components. We examine two possible attacks: replay
attacks, and active attacks in which an attacker is able to make minor modifi-
cations to the messages.
For the purposes of this analysis we do not make any assumptions about
encryption or other cryptographic protection of the card/card reader commu-
nications link. Note that, in many cases, the requirements for high speed data
transfer across this link, combined with the limited computational capabilities
of the card, may severely limit the possibilities for such protection. We also as-
sume throughout that fingerprint recognition is used as a method of cardholder
authentication to the smartcard.
Given our focus on card/reader communications link, we make other sim-
plifying assumptions. We assume that the smartcard is a tamper-proof device
and any transmission between biometric system modules taking place within the
card is therefore secure. We do not discuss the impact of using fake biometrics,
such as plastic fingers, to fool the system, although it was shown in [17] that this
is a possible attack with the current technology. This is an issue relating to the
fingerprint-based biometric technology itself, and as such is outside the scope of
this paper.
3This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we define the system archi-
tecture analysed in this paper. In Section 3 we identify the possible threats to
the communications link and propose two security protocols to prevent replay
attacks. In Section 4, we discuss active attacks and propose security protocols
to prevent them. We also propose a security protocol for mutual authentication
of the smartcard and the card reader and analyse some methods for sharing of a
secret key between the card and the reader. Finally we present our conclusions
in Section 5.
2 Biometric System Architecture
2.1 General model for biometric authentication
According to [5], a general biometric system is composed of the following logical
modules:
1. Data collection subsystem;
2. Signal processing subsystem;
3. Matching subsystem;
4. Storage subsystem;
5. Decision subsystem;
6. Transmission subsystem.
A block diagram for the general authentication model is given in Figure 1.
The authentication process involves the raw biometric data of the claimant be-
ing captured in the data collection subsystem by an input device or sensor, and
then transferred to the signal processing subsystem where the feature extrac-
tion takes place. The matching subsystem receives the extracted features from
the signal processing subsystem and retrieves the biometric reference template
associated with the claimed identity from the storage subsystem. The matching
subsystem then compares the submitted biometric sample with the reference
template yielding a score, which is a numeric value indicating the degree of sim-
ilarity between the submitted sample and the reference template. The decision
subsystem receives the score and, according to a confidence value based on se-
curity risks and risk policy, decides whether to accept the claimant or not. The
authentication decision is finally passed on to the application.
Note that these are logical modules, and therefore some systems may inte-
grate several of these components into one physical unit.
2.2 Biometric system architecture in a smartcard system
The architecture of the biometric system within a smartcard system, i.e. how the
logical modules of the biometric system are distributed between the smartcard
and the card reader, determines the nature of the data to be transferred between
the card and the card reader during biometric-based cardholder authentication.
Hence different architectures are open to different threats. If all modules of the
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Fig. 1. General model for biometric authentication.
biometric system reside in the card, the whole cardholder authentication process
takes place on the card and therefore no data transfer is needed. Provided that
the card is a secure physical entity, this is the most secure architecture possible.
However it is also the most costly and, with current technology, it is still a
challenge to manufacture an ISO-compliant card containing all the modules of
the biometric system.
Current biometrics-based smartcard systems must therefore distribute the
modules of the biometric scheme between the card and the card reader in some
way. In general, the signal processing module is very likely to be located in the
card reader, since it requires both significant computational power and, most
significantly, large amounts of RAM, and these requirements are likely to be
beyond the capabilities of current smartcards. The location of the other modules,
however, varies according to the system design and the biometric technology
being used.
For fingerprint recognition, a recent prototype implemented in the Finger Card
project [18, 13] has incorporated all but the signal processing module of the bio-
metric system into the smartcard. Within such an architecture, the biometrics-
based cardholder authentication is carried out as follows. The fingerprint image
is collected by a sensor on the smartcard and transferred from card to reader.
The reader performs feature extraction only, and transfers the extracted features
back to the card. The card then performs the matching process and reaches the
5authentication decision. This architecture is represented in Figure 2 and is the
basis of our analysis throughout the remainder of this paper.
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Fig. 2. The architecture of the biometrics-based authentication system within a smart-
card system.
3 Replay Attacks
In this paper we focus on possible attacks to the biometrics-based cardholder
authentication process. For the purpose of this analysis, we assume that the
smartcard is a tamper-proof device, and hence trust the security of any trans-
missions between those modules of the biometric system within the card. We
therefore assume that the only communications link open to attacks is that be-
tween the smartcard and the card reader. The main threats to this link can be
divided into threats to the ‘up-link’ (i.e. smartcard to reader) and ‘down-link’
(i.e. reader to smartcard).
In this section we assume that a possible attacker can only listen to the
communications channel, record messages, and/or subvert the protocol by re-
playing old messages, but the attacker is unable to modify messages or create
new messages. This is known as a replay attack [14]. Challenge-response proto-
cols [9–11] and zero-knowledge based protocols [12] may be used to counteract
replay attacks.
3.1 Possible threats
Suppose that an attacker is able to insert a bug in the communications link so
that he can record the messages being transferred, and he can also intercept
6messages and replace them with old recorded messages. According to [16], the
main threats to the communications link are as follows:
1. Up-link threats: an attacker can record the fingerprint image sent from card
to reader while the legitimate cardholder is authenticating himself to the
card. Once the attacker is in possession of a legitimate fingerprint image, he
can steal the card, insert the card into the card reader, intercept whatever
fingerprint image (probably his own) is being transferred to the card reader,
and replace it with the legitimate fingerprint image. The card reader would
then extract the features from a legitimate fingerprint image, and send them
to the card which would most probably authenticate the user (an attacker)
to the card.
2. Down-link threats: another possibility would be to record the (genuine) ex-
tracted features sent via the down-link, when the legitimate cardholder is
authenticating himself to the card. As before, the attacker can steal the card
once in possession of a set of extracted features for the legitimate cardholder.
When required to authenticate himself to the card, he can use his own fin-
gerprint to enable the protocol to proceed. The card reader will extract the
features from his illegitimate fingerprint image, which the attacker then in-
tercepts and replaces with the legitimate set of features when they are sent
across the down-link so that the attacker is authenticated to the card.
Note again that we are assuming here that the attacker can neither modify the
messages nor create them, only replay them. Note also that both these attacks
require the attacker to monitor card/reader communications when the card is in
use by its legitimate holder, prior to stealing or otherwise misappropriating the
card.
In the next two sections we propose two different security protocols designed
to address the threats we have just described.
3.2 Security protocol using a random string generator on the card
In this protocol, the freshness of the data is ensured by the use of random strings
and hash functions. The following protocol prevents both replay attacks.
1. The reader generates a random string R1 and sends it to the card.
2. The card (in fact the fingerprint sensor on the card) captures the fingerprint
image (BioData), generates a random string R2, and sends to the reader:
R2 || BioData || h(R2 || R1 || BioData). Note that h denotes a crypto-
graphic hash-function (see, for example, [14, 6]), and || denotes concatenation
of data items.
3. The reader computes h(R2 || R1 || BioData) and verifies that it is identical
to the value sent by the card.
4. The reader extracts the features (EF ) from the fingerprint image and sends
to the card: EF || h(R1 || R2 || EF ).
5. The card computes h(R1 || R2 || EF ) and verifies that it is identical to the
value sent by the reader.
7Since the reader generates a new random string R1 for each transaction, if
the value h(R2 || R1 || BioData) received by the reader is correct, then the
message from the card is not a replay of an old message. Therefore steps (1),
(2), and (3) prevent the up-link threat.
The down-link threat is prevented in steps (4) and (5). Since the card gener-
ates a new random string R2 for each transaction, if the value h(R1 || R2 || EF )
received by the card verifies correctly, then the message from the reader to the
card is not a replay of an old message.
Note that this protocol also partially ensures the integrity of the data being
transferred in both directions even though integrity is not an issue when replay
attacks are considered. In the up-link, any change in BioData during transmis-
sion would result in an incorrect hash-code h(R2 || R1 || BioData) in step 3. In
the down-link, any change in EF during transmission would result in an incor-
rect hash-code h(R1 || R2 || EF ) in step 5. Of course, a sophisticated attacker
could change the data and also recompute the hash-value; however, such an at-
tack requires a level of sophistication beyond the scope of the countermeasures
considered in this section.
3.3 Security protocol using biometric data as a random string
The nature of biometric data is such that two different measurements of the
same biometric feature from the same person are very likely to be different,
although the difference may be small. For example, when fingerprint recognition
is used, the fingerprint image captured by the sensor may vary, e.g., due to
skin conditions, dirt, grease, or the position in which the finger is placed on
the sensor. The biometric data can therefore be regarded as a unique random
string for each transaction, and can as such be incorporated by the card into
the security protocol. Although this approach may restrict the possible values
for the random string, it may have practical advantages if generating a random
string is a demanding task for the smartcard.
The protocol presented in the previous section would then be modified as
follows:
1. The reader generates a random string R and sends it to the card.
2. The card captures the fingerprint image (BioData) and sends to the reader:
BioData || h(BioData || R).
3. The reader computes h(BioData || R) and verifies that it is identical to the
value sent by the card.
4. The reader extracts the features (EF ) from the fingerprint image and sends
to the card: EF || h(EF || h(BioData || R)).
5. The card computes h(EF || h(BioData || R)) and verifies that it is identical
to the value sent by the reader.
As in the previous section, a new random string R is generated by the reader
for each transaction, and the use of the hash-code h(BioData || R) prevents
replay attacks in the up-link — steps (1), (2), and (3).
8The down-link threat is prevented in steps (4) and (5). Under the assumption
that the biometric data is very likely to be different at every collection, BioData
plays the role of a random string generated by the card. When the reader returns
to the card the value h(EF || h(BioData || R)) in step (4), the verification of
the hash-code in step (5) ensures that this is not a replay of an old message.
Note again that this protocol also partially ensures the integrity of the data
being transferred in both directions.
4 Active Attacks
Suppose now that the attacker can modify messages and also knows the details
of the protocol being used (including the hash-function). Since we have assumed
that all data (including the random strings) are transferred in plaintext, the
protocols of Section 3 can be defeated, since the attacker could intercept either
the fingerprint image or the extracted features and simply generate the hashes
as the protocol goes along. The integrity of the data being transferred between
the card and the card reader becomes an issue in this case. In order to prevent
such active attacks, we describe a slightly different protocol.
4.1 Message Authentication Codes (MACs) and Mutual
Authentication
Suppose the card and the card reader share a secret key. This allows both parties
to use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the place of the hash-code in
the protocols of Section 3. A MAC function, as specified in [14, 7, 8], is a key-
dependent cryptographic function with the property that it can map arbitrarily
long messages to fixed length strings. Moreover, only someone who knows the key
can produce a valid MAC for a data string. MACs are validated by re-computing
them using the shared secret key.
Hence, given that the secret key shared by card and card reader is not known
to the attacker, only a legitimate card and card reader can generate and verify
valid MACs. The protocols described in Section 3 remain the same except that
MACs are used instead of one-way hash-functions, and the protocols now provide
mutual authentication between the card and the card reader (see, for example,
[14, 11]).
4.2 Mutual authentication protocol prior to transaction
The sharing of a secret key would also make it possible for the card and the
card reader to run a mutual authentication protocol before any sensitive data is
transferred. In this way the card would be assured that it has not been inserted
into a hostile card reader. Conversely, the card reader can verify that the card
inserted is a legitimate one. A possible protocol for this scenario is as follows. This
protocol actually conforms to the relevant ISO/IEC standard for authentication
protocols, [9], and is closely related to the SKID3 protocol, [1]. Note that in
9this protocol m denotes a MAC function; specifically, mK(X) denotes the MAC
computed on data string X using key K.
1. The reader generates a random string R1 and sends it to the card.
2. The card generates a random string R2 and sends to the reader the two
values: R2 || mK(R2 || R1).
3. The reader computes mK(R2 || R1) and verifies that it is identical to the
value sent by the card.
4. The reader sends to the card: mK(R1 || R2).
5. The card computes mK(R1 || R2) and verifies that it is identical to the value
sent by the reader.
One possible reason for taking this approach — rather than the one in Section
4.1 — might be that computing a MAC on the fingerprint data is not feasible.
This is because, whereas PINs are very short, fingerprint samples are rather
large, and the limited computational and storage capabilities of the card may
severely limit the possibilities of a MAC computation on the fingerprint data.
Hence conducting the authentication protocol before the exchange of sensitive
data would be a reasonable alternative. Note however that this approach does
not prevent active attacks such as those described at the beginning of Section 4.
4.3 Sharing a secret key
Methods by which the card and the card reader can share a secret key are
now considered. One possible way to accomplish this is to have a single key
shared by all cards and card readers in the application. The fact that a universal
key is shared by all parties in the application domain is a potential source of
weakness, but the use of a secret key nevertheless makes things more difficult
for an attacker. Measures could also be adopted to improve the overall security
of such a system.
One such measure is to have expiry dates for keys. Keys would expire peri-
odically and new keys would be generated — together with a new card possibly.
Card readers would have to be equipped with copies of all the current keys. If
a key is compromised, this measure would at least limit the period of time in
which attacks could be carried out. A second approach would have all parties in
the application sharing a list of keys (K1, K2, . . . , Kn say) rather than a single
key. At the beginning of the protocol, in step 2, the card chooses at random a
key Ki (1 < i < n) from the list, and sends to the card reader:
R2 || Biodata || i || mKi(R2 || R1 || Biodata).
The card reader uses the key index i to determine which key is being used.
The protocol then proceeds with all MACs generated using Ki. In this case, even
if one key is compromised (e.g. by cryptanalytic means), the attacker would have
to make many attempts until the compromised key is used again. However, after
a few failed attempts to use the card, the card would be blocked, making it
unlikely that this attack would work. In order to further improve security, cards
could be given different subsets of the same set of keys, although all readers
would have all possible keys.
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A third approach avoids the weakness of using a universal key by giving a
unique key to each card. Each card reader would then need to have all such keys
or, at least, on-line access to a centralised database of keys. The need for a key
database could be avoided by deriving all card keys from a single secret master
key. Specifically it would be possible to derive a card secret key from a combi-
nation of a secret master key with a card serial number (e.g. using a one-way
function such as a cryptographic hash-function exhibiting pseudorandomness
properties). Such a scheme will work as long as the card reader has access to the
master key. Card key derivation from a card issuer secret master key is a solution
described in Annex A1.4 of EMV Book 2 [2], an industry standard governing
interactions between a card and terminal, and used for smartcard-based debit
and credit cards.
5 Conclusions
All the threats examined in this paper arise from an assumed lack of integrity for
the communications link between card and card reader. If it is assumed that the
card reader is a trusted device and has not been interfered with or replaced, then
guaranteeing the integrity of the link between the card and the card reader would
effectively prevent all the threats, even in the absence of any confidentiality for
data transferred.
If the integrity of the communications link is untrusted, then security pro-
tocols are able to prevent some attacks. Replay attacks can be prevented using
random numbers and hash-functions to ensure the freshness of the data. This
countermeasure requires the card to be capable of computing hash-functions
and/or generating random numbers. Alternatively, by its very randomic nature,
the biometric data may play the role of the random string generated on the
smartcard. Active attacks can be prevented using similar protocols, using MACs
instead of hash-functions. MACs can also be used to provide mutual authenti-
cation between the card and the reader. If the cryptographic capability of the
card is limited, then a mutual authentication protocol can be conducted before
any sensitive data is exchanged, instead of protecting the actual data transfer.
In any case, the use of MACs requires that the card and the reader share a secret
key, and possible means by which such keys could be managed have also been
discussed.
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